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Abstract 
A long-controversial issue, one that divides academics, government officials, 
elected representatives, and the U.S. defense industry, is whether defense 
contractors earn abnormal or excessive profits at the expense of taxpayers. Using 
an innovative industry-year-size matched measure of excessive profit, we 
demonstrate three findings.  First, when compared with their industry peers, defense 
contractors earn excessive profits. This result is evident when profit is measured by 
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Common Equity (ROCE), and Profit Margin 
Ratio (PMR). The evidence of excessive profit is less consistent if profit is measured 
by Operating Margin Ratio (OMR). Second, defense contractors’ excessive profit is 
more pronounced after 1992, consistent with the conjecture that the post-1992 
significant industry consolidation enabled superior profitability due to both the 
improved bargaining power and increased political influence of the newly combined 
firms. Finally, defense contractors’ excessive profitability increases with poorer 
corporate governance, as measured by the duality of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and the Chairman of the Board. 
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I. Introduction 
A long-standing controversial issue that divides academics, government 
officials, elected representatives, and the defense industry is whether U.S. defense 
contractors earn abnormal or excessive profits at the expense of taxpayers.  The 
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), the premier association representing the 
nation’s best known names in the aerospace and defense industries, has 
consistently insisted that “defense industry profitability lags significantly behind its 
industrial peers”  (Sylvester, 2010). On the other hand, a General Accounting Office 
(GAO) report in the 1980s found that defense contractors normally earned a higher 
Return on Assets (ROA) than their commercial counterparts (Carrington, 1986). The 
primary metric used by AIA is operating margin, measured as operating profit 
(earnings before interest and tax or EBIT) as a percentage of sales. In 2009, the 
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) issued a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)-
sponsored report, Defense Department Profit and Contract Finance Policies and 
Their Effects on Contract and Contractor Performance (Arnold, Harmon, Tyson, 
Fasana, & Wait, 2009). The IDA report confirms that the operating margin of the 
defense industry is lower than that of other sectors. However, the profit is “adequate” 
to sustain defense industry firms because they enjoy a more favorable financing 
structure under which the firm has much less of its own capital invested.   
One might expect that as a source of research that is more independent and 
relatively free from conflict of interest, the academic literature should provide more 
concrete and scientific evidence on this critical issue. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case. First, for whatever reason, there is a long history of avoidance of military-
related research among academics. As a result, studies in this field are quite limited. 
Second, the already-limited studies on this topic stop in the 1990s, leaving a blank 
for almost two decades. Early evidence on the issue of excessive profits is mixed. 
For example, Weidenbaum (1968) argued that defense profits are excessive. Bohi 
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evidence for arguing that defense business is any more or less profitable than 
nondefense business in general.” Agapos and Galloway (1970) stated, “There is 
almost no evidence that aerospace firms in contemporary America are able to reap 
unusually large or excessive profits” (p. 1103).  Stigler and Friedland (1971) 
documented that the profit rates of the top defense contractors substantially 
exceeded those of comparable non-defense companies. In summary, there was no 
consensus among academics in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The studies in the 1980s and 1990s were less divided in that, generally, they 
supported the proposition that defense industries earn higher profits than their non-
defense peers (Carrington, 1986; Trueger 1991). For instance, Lichtenberg (1992) 
found that the ROA of defense contractors, as a whole, was 68–82% higher than 
that of non-defense contractors. Moreover, those firms with the most government 
contracts were almost three times as profitable as their benchmark firms. The major 
explanation of the excess profits of defense contractors is the cost-shifting 
hypothesis (Rogerson, 1992; Thomas & Tung, 1992). According to this theory, a 
typical defense contractor has two types of revenue. The first stream of revenue 
derives from the DoD products whose prices are cost based and, hence, are cost 
sensitive. The other source of revenue is from typical commercial products whose 
prices are competition based and, therefore, are cost insensitive. Rogerson (1992) 
argued that a firm with a combination of defense products and commercial products 
will have an incentive to shift the common overhead costs from cost-insensitive 
segments to cost-sensitive segments. Since government contracts typically are 
reimbursed based upon costs and, more importantly, the price is determined based 
on negotiation between the two parties and is often renegotiated, this cost-shifting 
strategy will effectively result in the firm’s higher profitability. 
The early evidence has been quite consistent with the cost-shifting 
hypothesis. For instance, Thomas and Tung (1992) found that pension plans were 
overfunded when employees worked on government contracts and those excess 
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Rogerson (1992) not only documented the excess profitability of defense 
contractors, but also found that the defense product segments were significantly less 
capital intensive than less government-oriented segments, which is consistent with 
the cost-shifting hypothesis that predicts an input substitution effect (between capital 
and direct labor). Specifically, the cost-shifting theory conjectures that the defense 
product sector uses excess direct labor because the overhead allocation is 
traditionally based upon direct labor-based measures.  
A more recent study casts doubt on the validity of the cost-shifting hypothesis.  
McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) confirmed that defense contractors enjoyed excess 
profit from their government work, yet found no evidence of common overhead cost 
shifting. Specifically, they compared ROA among three types of segments within 
defense-contracting firms: (1) commercial segments, (2) government segments, and 
(3) mixed segments. The main testable hypothesis was the following: if the cost-
shifting theory underlies the excess profitability of defense contractors, one would 
expect to see the highest profit in the mixed segment, where managers have the 
most opportunities to shift common overhead costs. Opposite to what was expected, 
McGowan and Vendrzyk (2002) found either that the government segments (not the 
mixed segments) significantly outperformed the other two segments or that there 
was no significant difference across the three categories, depending on the specific 
time period examined. The overall evidence suggested that unusually high 
profitability is more likely due to non-accounting explanations than to strategic cost 
allocation. 
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we fill an almost two-decade-
long gap in the literature. Specifically, using up-to-date data, we investigate whether 
defense contractors earn excessive profits.  Our contribution to this goal is beyond a 
pure extension of the timeline. We employ an innovative measure of excessive profit 
based on a match of firms on three dimensions: industry, year, and size. This novel 
approach better captures the “excess” of the defense contractors’ profitability, if any 
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defense contractors’ excessive profits and lack of consensus on the explanation of 
these excessive profits, we provide alternative predictors of excessive profitability. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe 
our data. In Section III, we introduce our industry-year-size matched excessive profit 
and the empirical results and findings based on this measure. In Section IV, we 
hypothesize, and confirm, that industry consolidation after 1992 and corporate 
governance quality are two determinants of excess profits. We present our 
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II. Data 
Using fedspending.org as the source, we first identified a list of the top 500 
recipients (by dollar awarded) of defense contract awards for 2008.  For each 
publicly traded company on the list, the stock ticker was used to merge with 
accounting data from the Compustat database.  We were able to find a total of 112 
public firms from this top 500 list. Table 1 reports the name, dollar awarded, rank, 
stock ticker, SIC code, and public stock exchange code for these 112 public firms.  
Table 1. The Main Sample: 112 Public U.S. Firms From the 2008 Top 500 List  









LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP. $29,363,894,334  1 LMT 3760 11 
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP. $23,436,442,251  2 NOC 3812 11 
BOEING CO. $21,838,400,709  3 BA 3721 11 
RAYTHEON CO. $13,593,610,345  6 RTN 3812 11 
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. $13,490,652,077  7 GD 3790 11 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP. $8,283,275,612  8 UTX 3720 11 
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS $6,675,712,135  9 LLL 3663 11 
KBR INC. $5,997,147,425  10 KBR 1623 11 
NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP. $4,761,740,206  11 NAV 3711 11 
ITT CORP. $4,355,423,578  13 ITT 3812 11 
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTL 
CORP. $3,885,932,047  14 SAI 7373 11 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. $3,518,136,891  15 GE 9997 11 
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP. $3,230,197,590  16 CSC 7370 11 
HUMANA, INC. $2,952,008,623  18 HUM 6324 11 
TEXTRON, INC. $2,827,900,303  19 TXT 3721 11 
HEALTH NET, INC. $2,438,349,117  21 HNT 6324 11 
URS CORP. $2,402,033,979  22 URS 8711 11 
HEWLETT-PACKARD CO. $1,938,638,634  26 HPQ 3570 11 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC. $1,928,045,694  27 ATK 3480 11 
OSHKOSH TRUCK CORP. $1,863,726,822  30 OSK 3711 11 
HARRIS CORP. $1,841,470,263  31 HRS 3663 11 
BP P.L.C. $1,733,031,788  32 BP 2911 11 
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ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. $1,712,005,958  34 RDS.A 2911 11 
FORCE PROTECTION INDUSTRIES, 
INC. $1,360,427,189  36 FRPT 3790 14 
CACI INTERNATIONAL INC. $1,324,104,004  37 CACI 7373 11 
AMERISOURCE BERGEN CORP. $1,298,059,841  38 ABC 5122 11 
ROCKWELL COLLINS $1,290,813,364  39 COL 3728 11 
SHAW GROUP, INC. $1,162,267,243  40 SHAW 8711 11 
VALERO ENERGY CORP. $1,043,869,551  43 VLO 2911 11 
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC. $951,295,410  45 JEC 1600 11 
VSE CORP. $910,970,473  47 VSEC 8711 14 
MCKESSON CORP. $903,799,326  48 MCK 5122 11 
CARDINAL HEALTH INC. $856,333,988  50 CAH 5122 11 
DELL COMPUTER CORP. $852,813,703  51 DELL 3571 14 
EXXON MOBIL CORP. $836,548,150  52 XOM 2911 11 
MANTECH INTERNATIONAL CORP. $655,579,972  61 MANT 7373 14 
FLIR SYSTEMS, INC. $507,944,847  71 FLIR 3812 14 
GOODRICH CORP. $487,753,671  73 GR 3728 11 
TETRA TECH, INC. $472,960,770  77 TTEK 8711 14 
IBM CORP. $438,446,918  81 IBM 7370 11 
PERINI CORP. $436,363,793  82 TPC 1540 11 
FLUOR CORP. $430,878,065  84 FLR 1600 11 
CERADYNE INC. $417,616,849  86 CRDN 3290 14 
AECOM TECHNOLOGY CORP. $380,250,228  91 ACM 8711 11 
AT&T INC. $371,099,463  95 T 4813 11 
KRAFT FOODS INC. $367,840,952  97 KFT 2000 11 
OWENS & MINOR INC. $365,861,498  99 OMI 5047 11 
CUBIC CORP. $354,623,567  102 CUB 3812 11 
GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK 
CORP. $324,475,211  113 GLDD 1600 14 
CATERPILLAR, INC. $323,676,276  114 CAT 3531 11 
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO. $321,983,149  115 PG 2840 11 
TYSON FOODS INC. $319,486,334  117 TSN 2011 11 
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS $319,365,283  118 VZ 4812 11 
CHEVRONTEXACO CORP. $310,558,853  122 CVX 2911 11 
SRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. $297,913,799  128 SRX 7370 11 
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION CO. $292,263,100  131 GVA 1600 11 
ACCENTURE $288,517,607  132 ACN 8742 11 
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. $285,123,825  134 JCI 2531 11 
GTSI $271,996,636  141 GTSI 5045 14 
EXPRESS SCRIPTS $215,750,049  162 ESRX 6411 14 
NCI INFORMATION SYSTEMS $214,517,445  163 NCIT 7373 14 
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TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD. $202,567,751  172 TYC 9997 11 
COMTECH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
CORP. $202,082,670  173 CMTL 3663 14 
GENERAL MILLS, INC. $200,017,932  176 GIS 2040 11 
TESORO HAWAII CORP. $199,447,230  177 TSO 2911 11 
AEROVIRONMENT INC. $192,462,098  182 AVAV 3721 14 
SIEMENS AG $192,129,128  183 SI 9997 11 
AAR CORP. $187,717,969  187 AIR 5080 11 
SYSCO CORP. $179,074,006  195 SYY 5140 11 
REFINERY HOLDING CO., L P $177,749,226  198 WNR 2911 11 
DEERE & CO. $164,340,456  206 DE 3523 11 
VIASAT, INC. $156,815,300  217 VSAT 3663 14 
TOTAL SA $154,271,244  222 TOT 2911 11 
ORBITAL SCIENCES CORP. $153,884,356  223 ORB 3760 11 
PEPSICO INC. $149,527,183  231 PEP 2080 11 
UNISYS $142,990,124  239 UIS 7373 11 
TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. $134,222,291  254 TDY 3663 11 
BALL CORP. $131,696,095  259 BLL 3411 11 
ELBIT SYSTEMS LTD. $127,331,460  266 ESLT 7373 14 
CONAGRA, INC. $125,264,234  270 CAG 2000 11 
ORACLE CORP. $122,646,803  274 ORCL 7372 14 
GENERAL MOTORS CORP. $120,929,817  279 GM 3711 11 
EATON CORP. $117,792,917  286 ETN 3620 11 
UNILEVER NV $112,089,508  292 UL 2000 11 
MOOG, INC. $111,608,841  293 MOG.A 3728 11 
ALON USA LP $111,102,800  296 ALJ 2911 11 
COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES INC. $93,991,833  343 CCE 2086 11 
XEROX CORP. $91,275,424  356 XRX 3577 11 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON $89,990,235  363 JNJ 2834 11 
AMERICAN APPAREL INC. $89,975,062  364 APP 2300 12 
CAMPBELL SOUP CO. $88,645,010  367 CPB 2030 11 
PHILIPS GLOEILAMPENFABRIEKEN $83,662,212  387 PHG 3600 11 
INTERMEC CORP. $83,566,808  388 IN 3577 11 
CAE CORP. $83,563,697  389 CAE 3690 11 
IRIDIUM SATELLITE LLC $80,141,588  408 IRDM 4899 14 
TESORO PETROLEUM CORP. $79,170,251  413 TSO 2911 11 
DEL MONTE FOODS CO. $77,962,809  419 DLM 2000 11 
AMERICAN SCIENCE AND ENGRG $76,545,302  429 ASEI 3844 14 
CCI GROUP LIMITED LIABILITY CO. $75,872,038  432 GIB 7373 11 
MICHAEL BAKER CORP. $74,263,592  437 BKR 8711 12 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 8 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
ESTERLINE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. $68,716,933  462 ESL 3823 11 
DYNAMICS RESEARCH CORP. $67,638,183  470 DRCO 7373 14 
INTEGRAL SYSTEMS, INC. $67,261,245  473 ISYS 7373 14 
MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO. $67,166,647  474 MSA 3842 11 
WORLD FUEL SERVICE CORP. $66,258,375  478 INT 5172 11 
SARA LEE CORP. $65,361,053  482 SLE 2000 11 
WILLIAMS COMPANIES INC. $65,024,852  483 WMB 4922 11 
HORIZON LINES LLC $65,008,856  484 HRZ 4400 11 
CASE CORP. $64,498,750  488 CNH 3523 11 
Table 1 shows that the vast majority of firms in our sample are either traded 
on the NYSE or NASDAQ, consistent with the perception that top defense prime 
contractors tend to be big and established companies. Moreover, DoD contracts with 
a wide spectrum of industries as evidenced by various SIC codes. Table 2 illustrates 
the distribution of industry membership. In particular, our 112 sample firms cover 24 
unique industry sectors, as defined by 2-digit SIC codes.  
Table 2. The Distribution of 112 Sample Firms Across 2-Digit SIC  
Industry Sectors   
Industry Name 
2-Digit 
SIC Code Frequency 
Transportation Equipment 37 15 
Business Services 73 13 
Petroleum Refining 29 11 
Food & Kindred Products 20 10 
Electronic Equipment & Components, except Computer Equipment 36 8 
Measuring, Analyzing, & Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical & Optical Goods 38 8 
Industrial & Commercial Machinery & Computer Equipment 35 7 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management & Related Services 87 7 
Heavy Construction other than Building Construction Contractors 16 5 
Wholesale Trade-Non-Durable Goods 51 5 
Communications 48 3 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 50 3 
Non-Classifiable Establishments 99 3 
Chemicals & Allied Products 28 2 
Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery & Transportation Equipment 34 2 
Insurance Carriers 63 2 
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Apparel & Other Products made from Fabrics & Similar Materials 23 1 
Furniture & Fixtures 25 1 
Paper & Allied Products 26 1 
Stone, Clay, Glass, & Concrete Products 32 1 
Water Transportation 44 1 
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 49 1 
Insurance Agents, Brokers, & Service 64 1 
Total 
112 
Table 3 presents basic statistics of various accounting measures for the 112 
sample firms in fiscal year 2008. In particular, we report ROA, ROCE, Total Assets, 
Revenue, Profit Margin Ratio (PMR), Operating Margin Ratio (OMR), Long-term 
Debt Ratio, and Dollar Awarded as Percentage of Revenue. The mean values of 
Total Assets and Total Revenue were $42 billion and $39 billion, respectively. The 
mean ROA (ROCE) was 5.76% (15.86%). Profit Margin and Operating Margin 
averaged at about 5.19% and 9.76%, respectively.  About 18% of assets were 
financed by long-term debt and the government contracts contributed about 18% of 
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Table 3. The Basic Statistics of 112 Sample Firms in Year 2008  
 Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
ROA(%) 5.76 6.21 -33.89 19.83 6.99 
ROCE(%) 15.86 16.54 -206.49 112.29 34.45 
Total Assets (millions) 38,737 7,433 147 797,769 92,650 
Total Sales (millions) 42,034 14,246 160 458,361 79,559 
PMR(%) 5.19 4.86 -20.71 24.05 6.05 
OMR(%) 9.76 8.80 -8.04 36.79 6.67 
Long-Term Debt Ratio 17.84 16.23 0 63.57 13.12 
Dollars  Awarded as 
Percent of Sales (%) 
16.26 4.83 0.07 102.57 22.27 
Note. ROA = Net Income/Total Assets; ROCE = Net Income/Common Equity; PMR = Net 
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III. Empirical Analyses and Results 
A. Measuring Excessive Profits 
A challenging issue that contributes to the controversy over defense 
contractors’ excessive profits is the definition of excessive profits. We argue that 
some approaches are fundamentally flawed. For instance, a very common and 
seemingly sensible method is to compare the profitability measures of defense 
contractors with similar measures of the member firms of an index.  In a recent 
report (Arnold et al., 2009), the AIA uses Figure 1 to make the point that “defense 







Figure 1. Defense Industry Operating Margin—The Lowest Returns  
Amongst its Peers  
(Arnold et al., 2009) 
Note. This analysis was performed by the CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives Group, using 
data from Bloomberg. (1) The CSIS Defense Index comprises 34 publically traded 
companies with the majority of revenues derived from defense business. (2) For the S&P 
500, the CSIS obtained historical data for the period 1988–2009 for the constituents as of 
July 2010. 
This approach is also used by some defense-related research centers. A 
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Ben-Ari, and Moore (2011) compared operating profit margins for the CSIS Defense, 
S&P 500, and S&P 1500 industrial indices between 1990 and 2010. Berteau et al. 
(2011) claimed that, while the CSIS Defense Index’s operating margin is higher 
today than at any point in the past 20 years, it has been consistently lower than 
those of the commercial indices. 
Worrying about the explicit and implicit inferences drawn from the above 
“defense versus S&P index” comparisons, we asked the following question: what 
implications concerning defense contractors’ excessive profits, if any, can be drawn 
from these figures? Our answer is none. Just because we observe that defense 
contractors’ operating margins (or any other profitability measure) are lower than 
that of the S&P 500 index does not necessarily rule out the possibility of defense 
contractors’ excessive profits. The major reasoning is that it’s meaningless to use a 
very broadly defined index as the benchmark for inferring the defense contractors’ 
normal profitability. Defense contractors, as a whole or as individual firms, and the 
broad market are two different animals. Even a narrowly defined index, such as a 
manufacturing index, is also problematic. The bottom line is this: defense contractors 
span a wide range of industries. For instance, our 112 public U.S. firms on the 2008 
top 500 list cover 24 unique 2-digit SIC codes. If measured by 4-digit SIC codes, the 
number goes up to 56 industries! As pointed out by McGahan and Porter (2002), 
profitability is very industry specific. Different industries have different risk 
exposures, competitions, and entry barriers, among many other differences. 
Therefore, given the wide number of industries represented by defense contractors, 
the correct benchmark for inferring defense contractors’ normal profitability (and 
hence excessive profitability) must focus on the individual-firm level. There is no 
one-size-fits-all benchmark, not the S&P, not a manufacturing index, not any readily 
available index.  
Based on the theoretical literature, we propose an innovative measure to 
assess the excessive profitability of defense contractors. McGahan and Porter 
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Moreover, numerous papers demonstrate that firm size should be considered in 
constructing a benchmark for comparison (Albuquerque, 2009; Dechow, Hutton, & 
Sloan, 1996). Hence, we devised an industry-year-size matched excessive profit 
measure for each individual firm-year and, in turn, used it as the basis for analyzing 
our research questions.  
Our excessive profit measure was defined as follows. First, we assumed that 
a significant contracting relationship continuity exists between the government and 
defense contractors. Hence, we extended the use of our 2008 list of top defense 
contractors to all the other sample years, as well. This likely introduced some noise 
into the data. However, since any noise would only work against finding any results, 
we were willing to sacrifice the power of the test in order to avoid extremely time-
consuming data collection work. Second, for each of the 112 firms, we used their 
stock ticker to map into the Compustat database and extract various accounting 
variables across a wide range of years, 1950–2010. So a single firm on our list 
would likely have multiple hits (each hit was a firm-year) depending on how long the 
firm had existed. Note that the maximum possible number of hits was 61 for any 
particular firm. We report that mapping our 112 firms to the Compustat database 
yielded a total of 4,099 firm-years, representing 110 firms (two tickers had no hits). 
On average, the number of hits per firm was 37.26, with a minimum of four and a 
maximum of 61. Finally, for each of the 4,099 firm-years, we tried to find a 
benchmark firm-year, whose profit became the proxy for “normal profit” of the firm-
year investigated. The benchmark firm-year was selected based on a three-
dimension match on industry, year, and size. Specifically, we went to the same 
industry-year, where industry membership was defined by 4-digit SIC codes, and 
identified the non-defense (i.e., not on our 112-firm list) firm that had the best size 
match with our defense firm-year. The difference between the profit of the firm-year 
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B. Empirical Results and Findings 
Table 4 is similar to Table 3, except that we included all 4,099 firm-years as 
opposed to only year, 2008. Note that due to missing values, the sample sizes for 
calculating the various measures were less than 4,099 and varied across different 
metrics.  
Table 4. The Basic Statistics of 4,099 Sample Firm-Years From 1950–2010 
 N Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
ROA(%) 4,050 5.59 5.78 -87.55 76.91 6.16 
ROCE(%) 3,567 14.28 13.79 -953.98 1274.14 56.67 
Total Assets 
(millions) 
4,058 16,048 1,763 0.40 797,769 51,793 
Total Sales 
(millions) 
4,058 14,716 2,430 1.35 458,361 35,979 
PMR(%) 4,037 4.36 4.11 -99.74 100.22 5.92 
OMR(%) 4,050 8.61 7.86 -98.62 40.31 6.64 
Long-Term Debt 
Ratio 
4,057 16.09 14.63 0 83.40 12.21 
A comparison between Table 4 and Table 3 shows that multiple-year 
statistics, especially the mean and the median, are fairly close to the one-year 
(2008) statistics. The notable difference is that the firms’ assets and sales were 
higher in 2008, which was expected. 
Next, we analyzed our key measure: excessive profit. Table 5 reports the 
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Table 5. The Excessive Profitability of 4,099 Firm-Years From 1950–2010 
Panel A: Size Matched by Total Assets 
 N Mean Min Max Std Dev t P-value 
Excessive ROA(%) 3,809 1.12 -23.49 44.17 7.08 9.77**** <0.0001 
Excessive 
ROCE(%) 
3,314 3.65 -143.64 175.57 25.73 8.08**** <0.0001 
Excessive PMR(%) 3,809 0.28 -31.82 74.56 7.87 2.22** 0.03 
Excessive OMR(%) 3,777 -0.09 -59.59 257.33 10.32 -0.52 0.60 
Note. ** indicates a 5% significance level; *** indicates a 1% significance level; and **** 
indicates a significance level of less than 0.01%. Excessive profitability measures were 
derived based on an industry-year-size matching. Industry was defined as 4-digit SIC code, 
while the size was defined as total assets.  
Panel B: Size Matched by Revenue 
 N Mean Min Max Std Dev t P-value 
Excessive ROA(%) 3,825 1.04 -21.89 44.37 7.29 8.80**** <0.0001 
Excessive 
ROCE(%) 
3,246 3.71 -142.09 178.70 26.08 8.10**** <0.0001 
Excessive PMR(%) 3,825 0.45 -31.82 74.91 7.23 3.85*** 0.0001 
Excessive OMR(%) 3,793 0.35 -48.23 69.29 7.80 2.77*** 0.006 
Note. ** indicates a 5% significance level; *** indicates a 1% significance level; and **** 
indicates a significance level of less than 0.01%. Excessive profitability measures were 
derived based on an industry-year-size matching. Industry was defined by 4-digit SIC code, 
while size was defined as total revenue.  
Panel A of Table 5 (size matched by total assets) demonstrates that the 
average excessive ROA (ROCE) was 1.12% (3.65%), both statistically significant at 
a level of less than 0.01%. The excessive Profit Margin Ratio (PMR) was positive 
and had a mean of 0.28%, which was statistically significant at a 5% level. The 
Operating Margin Ratio (OMR), which is most often used by the defense industry to 
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average excessive value. However, the magnitude (-0.09%) was too small to be 
statistically significant. 
Panel B of Table 5 (size matched by Revenue) provides similar evidence as 
Panel A, except on Operating Margin Ratio (OMR). The average excessive ROA 
(ROCE) was 1.04% (3.71%), both statistically significant at a level of  less than 
0.01%. The excessive Profit Margin Ratio (PMR) was positive and had a mean of 
0.45%, which was statistically significant at a 0.1% level. In contrast to Panel A, 
however, the Operating Margin Ratio (OMR) was positive and statistically significant 
as well, consistent with the other measures of profitability.  
The overall evidence suggests that, measured by ROA, ROCE, and PMR, 
defense contractors consistently demonstrate superior profitability than their 
industry-year-size matched non-defense peers. Another important finding is that, in 
contrast to what the AIA claims, the Operating Margin Ratios of defense contractors 
are, at least, not significantly lower than that of their industry-year-size matched non-
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IV. Determinants of Excessive Profits 
A. Time Series Variation Determinant: Industry 
Consolidation 
We first investigated whether the defense industry consolidation in the past 
two decades has increased defense contractors’ excessive profit. In 1993, then-
Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Perry hosted a dinner that is now called “The Last 
Supper” with the CEOs of the major defense companies. During the dinner, Perry 
urged his guests to consolidate their industry because the DoD would no longer 
support the high infrastructure costs of a fragmented set of industries due to lower 
demand induced by the “peace dividend” from the end of the Cold War. As a result, 
a series of high profile mergers and acquisitions (M&As) happened in subsequent 
years, including but not limited to the following cases: Boeing acquiring McDonnell 
Douglas, Lockheed acquiring Martin Marietta, and Northrop acquiring Grumman.  
It is reasonable to assume that as the industry structure shifted toward a less 
competitive nature, the bargaining power in (re)negotiation, as well as the political 
influence over the Pentagon, of the largest defense contractors, would increase.  
Consequently, excessive profitability became more attainable. Hence, we have our 
first hypothesis, H1: 
H1: Defense contractors’ excessive profitability relative to their industry 
peers became more pronounced after 1992. 
To test H1, we regressed various measures of excessive profit onto a dummy 
variable that took the value of one if the year was post 1992 and zero otherwise. 
Table 6 reports the regression results. 
Table 6 shows that excessive profitability, measured by ROA and PMR, 
increased after 1992. For example, when size is matched by revenue, post-1992 
ROA was almost 1% higher than pre-1992 era. Given the average public firms’ ROA 
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economically significant. This result held regardless of whether the size was 
matched by total assets or revenue. However, the magnitude of the increase, as well 
as the statistical significance of the change, was more pronounced if size was 
matched by revenue. We did not find any statistically significant difference in ROCE 
and OMR between pre- and post-1992 periods. 






Dependent Variable: Industry-Year-Size Matched Excessive Profit 





































Note. * indicates a 10% significance level; ** indicates a 5% significance level; and *** 
indicates a 1% significance level. 
Since the most dramatic defense industry consolidation happened after 1992, 
we believe that the above evidence reasonably supports the conjecture that the 
industry consolidation made the excessive profits of defense contractors more 
attainable.   
B. Cross-Sectional Variation Determinant: Corporate 
Governance 
Another possible determinant of excessive profit is the quality of corporate 
governance. Laffont and Tirole (1993) pointed out that the information asymmetry 
between the government and contractors could give rise to the “extraction of 
information rents” that is associated with potential excessive profits. Based on this 
observation, we conjecture that a better governed corporation would be less likely to 
engage in such opportunistic and unethical “rent-seeking” behavior.  Hence, we 
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H2: The defense contractors’ excessive profitability relative to their 
industry peers increased with poorer corporate governance. 
To test H2, we referred to the finance literature for empirical measures of 
corporate governance. Several key governance mechanisms are documented to 
impact governance quality. First, Jensen (1993) argued that the separation of the 
CEO and Chairman of the Board is an important feature of good corporate 
governance because otherwise the CEO is given too much power and too little 
oversight. A number of other studies (Goyal & Park, 2002,;Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) 
also support the importance of the separation of CEO and Chairman. Second, most 
researchers believe that the quality of oversight deteriorates when the board gets 
bigger due to the “free-rider” problem (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; 
Yermack, 1996). Finally, board independence, as measured by the percentage of 
independent directors, plays a role in limiting the opportunistic behavior of 
management arising from conflicts of interest (Brickley & James, 1987; Weisbach, 
1988; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). We, therefore, regressed our various measures of 
excessive profit onto the corporate governance variables mentioned by the above 
studies. Table 7 reports the regression results. Note that we constructed our 
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Dependent Variable: Industry-Year-Size Matched Excessive Profit 

















Intercept  0.0097 0.0528 0.0003 -0.0041 0.0087 0.0491 0.0015 -0.0005 
CEO-Chairman  























































Note. * indicates a 10% significance level; ** indicates a 5% significance level; *** indicates 
a 1% significance level. The CEO-Chairman dummy took a value of one if the CEO was also 
the chairman. Board size was defined as the number of directors. Board independence was 
defined as the percentage of independent directors on the board. 
Table 7 shows that excessive profitability, measured by ROA and PMR, was 
higher for those firms with CEOs also holding the title of Chairman of the Board. This 
result held regardless if the size was matched by total assets or revenue. Board size 
and board independence did not appear to have any impact on any measure of 
excessive profitability except that board size marginally affected the excessive 
profitability measured by OMR. Similar to Table 6, we found few noteworthy results 
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C. The Robustness Test 
In Section IV.A, we suggested that industry consolidation played a role in 
determining the excessive profits of defense contractors. Moreover, in Section IV.B, 
we reported that the poorer quality of corporate governance, measured by the non-
separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board, was positively associated with the 
excessive profits. Although it is unlikely, we cannot completely refute the possibility 
that these two factors, industry consolidation and corporate governance, have 
confounding effects. To make sure one factor did not subsume the other, we ran a 
multiple regression by including both the post-1992 dummy and the CEO-Chairman 
dummy as independent variables. Table 8 reports the results. 
The basic result, shown in Table 8, was that the two determinants we 
identified in Sections IV.A and IV.B did not subsume each other. The magnitudes, as 
well as statistical significances, appeared to be lower than seen in Tables 6 and 7. 
However, the coefficients remained both statistically and economically significant. 
Table 8. Two Determinants of Excessive Profitability: Industry Consolidation  






Dependent Variable: Industry-Year-Size Matched Excessive Profit 


























































Note. * indicates a 10% significance level; ** indicates a 5% significance level; and *** 
indicates a 1% significance level. Note that, as another alternative, we included board size 
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V. Conclusion 
In this study, we used an innovative industry-year-size matched measure of 
excessive profit and investigated the long-controversial issue of defense contractors’ 
alleged superior profitability. Using alternative profit measures, our results indicated 
that defense contractors earn excessive profits relative to their industry peers. This 
result was strongest when profit was measured by ROA, ROCE, or PMR. The 
evidence of excessive profit was less consistent if profit was measured by OMR. 
Another important result from this research was that the defense contractors’ 
excessive profit was more pronounced after 1992, consistent with the conjecture that 
the significant defense industry consolidation after 1992 enabled superior profitability 
due primarily to both the strong bargaining power and increased political influence of 
the remaining firms. A final research result was that poor corporate governance, as 
measured by the non-separation of the CEO and the Chairman of the Board, led to 
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